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ABSTRACT: The article presents an in-depth and detailed reflection on the concept of „integral inter­
pretation” put forward by the Polish musicologist Mieczysław Tomaszewski.
The problematics of interpretation has for many years been the focus of Tomaszewski’s attention and 
interest, as evidenced by his numerous publications devoted to it. They culminate in the formulation 
of this concept, described by the author as the method of an adequate interpretation of a musical work. 
In contrast to many contemporary approaches to the issue of the scope of musicology’s subject area, 
for Tomaszewski the concept of a musical work is central to the discipline, and he poses questions 
concerning its ontology and understanding in the spirit of Roman Ingarden’s theory of musical work, 
to which he frequently refers. Tomaszewski regards the process of interpretation as a kind of „rising” to 
the level of the work, the meaning of which (intentio operis), often identified with the authorial mean­
ing (intentio auctoris), stands at the highest point in the hierarchy of meanings ascribed -  from this 
point of view -  to the work. In turn, the work itself functions in different phases, existing as a score, a 
performance, a result of the processes of perception and as its reception within a culture.
In my article I attempt not only to present Tomaszewski’s method, but above all to argue against its 
anachronicity and limitations resulting from a lack of reference both to contemporary artistic practice 
and contemporary research methodology in the humanities and in musicology.
KEYWORDS: musical work, Tomaszewski, Ingarden, methodology of musicology, interpretation, 
integrity, value.
The diagnosis of a certain methodological problem in musicology which 
I reveal here is closely connected with the concept of the ‘integral interpretation’ 
of the musical work put forward in 2000 by the Polish musicologist Mieczysław 
Tomaszewski.1 The problem of interpretation has been, and indeed remains, 
particularly prominent in Tomaszewski’s wide-ranging reflections. It has appeared 
essentially at every step, implicitly in his historical books and articles devoted
1 Mieczysław Tomaszewski, W stronę interpretacji integralnej dzieła muzycznego [Towards 
an integral interpretation of the musical work] (Kraków, 2000). Cf. M. Tomaszewski, "Musical 
Work within the Space of Culture", in Music and the Arts, ed. E. Tarasti (Helsinki, 2006), 59-75.
chiefly to the music and musical culture of the eighteenth-twentieth centuries 
and explicitly in his numerous theoretical works. These labours of the mind, fo­
cused on the core issues of ‘humanistic musicology’2 and mapping out the critical 
junctures in our discipline, have stimulated significant response and gained posi­
tions of authority in many milieux in Poland. Yet the issue addressed by Tomasze­
wski has a more than local scope. Perceiving the importance of interpretation—in 
which, of course, he is not alone—the Polish musicologist has attempted to formu­
late an adequate method for the analysis and interpretation of the work of music 
which would restore the category of the work to its due place in the ever-expanding 
subject area of musicological research. As evidence to this effect, Tomaszewski often 
articulates in his writings a thesis according to which the essence of interpretation 
is ‘rising to the level of the work’. This view is of such significance in Tomaszewski’s 
conception that I shall return to it many times.
And one further remark. The stance adopted by Tomaszewski is also a distant 
echo of the category of mathesis universalis, the essentially utopian ideal of order 
which, as we surmise today, science and its cognitively credible methods wish to 
fulfil. Tomaszewski’s concept of a method for the ‘integral interpretation’ of the 
musical work embodies the dream of mathesis unversalis, whilst the ‘adequacy’ of 
that method is the premise from which he derives his entire reasoning.
*
Mieczysław Tomaszewski is undoubtedly an advocate of a prescriptive interpretation 
of musicology, as he convinces us: ‘How is musicology and how could it be, and even 
how should it be, so as to be able to answer the questions asked of it by contemporary 
man?’ (p. 9) I fully support the ethical tone of this utterance, although at the same 
time it augurs certain perils for anyone formulating a programme for the academic 
discipline they practise in terms of‘obligation’. We ask why musicology would venture 
into the near or distant future along those particular lines rather than any others and 
what criteria we would apply to set the course and aims of the postulated changes. 
Should they—and if so, to what extent—have the character of abstract directives 
based on a professed system of values or, on the contrary, arise from the changes 
taking place in the humanities and in reflection on the subject of musicological study? 
Before I move on to a polemic with the concept of ‘integral interpretation’, I shall 
try to explain the essence of Tomaszewski’s view on the situation of musicology.3
• Firstly, I would call the model of musicology proposed by Tomaszewski 
a mysterious-solar model. After all, it is undeniably dominated by the mood and 
methodology of that which is positive and constructive, which renders coherent
2 M. Tomaszewski, W stronę muzykologii humanistycznej [Towards a humanistic 
musicology], in Interpretacja [Interpretation], ed. L. Bielawski et al. (Warsaw, 2000).
3 M. Tomaszewski, Interpretacja integralna dzieła muzycznego. Rekonesans [An integral 
interpretation of the musical work. Reconnaissance] (Kraków, 2000), 9-17.
(Bonum ex integra causa), which aims to give the reader and the author the 
feeling that so long as we point out the ‘flaws’, muddiness and areas of neglect of 
our discipline and adopt a few simple ‘healing procedures’, then its situation will 
improve. Such a role in Tomaszewski’s conception is to be played by the ‘integral 
interpretation’ of the musical work.4
• Secondly, I sense that Tomaszewski sees the future of musicology sub specie 
humanitatis, advocating its traditional interpretation, underpinned by the autho­
rity of history and worthy historiography, but not overly sensitive to the turbulence 
of contemporaiy humanism. The problem is that today we do not know for certain 
what ‘humanism’ signifies, although I agree with the author that it would be good 
if we could clarify its meaning. But that remains impossible, and our endeavours 
in this area, even when treated with the utmost seriousness, in keeping with the 
motto of the ‘dehumanisation of the humanities’, will not necessarily bring effects 
that satisfy all the parties in the debate about the status of values in contempo­
raiy culture. Furthermore, the ‘direction of hope’ that Tomaszewski subtly plots, 
namely a return to humanistic-artistic reflection dominated, until recently, by the 
naturalist mindset, is unrealistic, insofar as the treatment of music as a biocultural 
phenomenon has become a scientific fact. It demands that we take account both of 
certain ontological premises and also of methodological procedures, regardless of 
whether we ourselves choose this or that path of enquiry towards an understanding 
of what music is and what influence it has on our lives in culture.5
• Thirdly, in incorporating a critical moment in his utterance, Tomaszewski 
ascribes it a rather limited role. I do not call the author to anarchy, but the sentence 
that ‘from time to time some of the leading musicologists even [emphasis M. J.] 
dare to demand in the process of interpretation such general aesthetic categories 
as grandeur, succinctness and intimacy’ is simply not adequate to the dynamic of 
the internal changes taking place in musicology since at least the eighties, although 
we find traces of this dynamic earlier still, chiefly in Anglo-American thought. I am 
not concerned here with that one sentence alone, but with the peculiar critical 
methodological reticence that is characteristic of many of Tomaszewski’s texts.
• Fourthly, Tomaszewski invites us on a path towards a multi-faceted 
humanistic musicology, rightly respecting the mysteriousness and wondrousness
4 M. Tomaszewski, W stronę interpretacji integralnej, 49-65. This text is discussed in detail 
further in the present article, mainly in respect to its methodological perspective and the issues 
concerning the ontology and cognition of music. Earlier, however, for example on the question of 
expression or context, I shall be referring to it more briefly. Page references for quoted passages 
are given in parentheses.
5 In discussing the ‘principle of hiérarchisation’, in W stronę interpretacji integralnej (p. 
63), Tomaszewski invokes the now completely outdated opinion of Ernst H. Gombrich that the 
problem of value would be present in analyses of works of art if ‘the humanities did not try to 
imitate the natural sciences in ignoring the problem of value’. However distant we might be from 
a naturalistically-determined humanism, we cannot hide behind a screen of ignorance, since the 
problem of value is also, although obviously in a different way, present in naturalistic enquiry.
(in the Heinian sense) of the musical art. Yet he proposes that to achieve this 
goal we seek one-sided and traditional means and tools. Such notions as ‘work’, 
‘value’, ‘artistry’ and many others, which for Tomaszewski would lend coherence 
and ‘lustre’ to the musicology dictionary are for many areas of the musical activity 
of contemporary man—not just the composer-artist in the Europocentric sense 
of the word—inappropriate, unfortunate or awkward. Today, they are no longer 
capable of ordering the entire subject area of musicology, unless they were to be 
fundamentally redefined, which is seldom beneficial to such notions.
• Fifthly, Tomaszewski strongly accentuates the hierarchic (‘unity’ as the centre, 
‘integrity’, ‘factors’, ‘aspects’) and—as I would boldly assert—hieratic (the ‘lustrous’ 
dictionary, as mentioned above) character of his methodological proposition. In 
writing forcibly that ‘[...] in every coherent system of culture there exists a specified 
hierarchy of values [...]’,6 Tomaszewski attaches little weight to the post-modernist 
watershed, which is not the source of all evil that many thinkers would have us 
believe, but which has brought to anthropology, history and literary scholarship 
significant questions and occasionally even solutions to important problems, for 
example in the redefining of the notions referred to above7 or the awareness of 
changing research tools, the neutrality of science, the role of the researcher and his 
involvement in the subject, and finally the way we apprehend interpretation. Here, 
my insistent thinking about interpretation as the centre of musicological reflection, 
conditioning to a considerable extent all the other problems and aspects, converges 
with what Tomaszewski writes: ‘An inspection of the situation of musicology in 
its singular, but central aspect that is the interpretation of the musical work [...] 
inclines one to state that we are witnessing a change of paradigm
• Sixthly, I have no doubt that the way Tomaszewski proposes of understand­
ing our discipline’s subject area, which would be charged with delimiting at least 
the approximate boundaries within which musicology should move in building its 
identity, is a narrow one. I pass over here the fact that in more recent times debate 
has raged over the possibility of accepting that we already live in the post-discipli­
nary era, including in musicology. The view of a too narrowly defined subject area 
of musicology arises mainly from the ‘attempt to define’ our discipline formulated 
by Tomaszewski (see p. 7 of the text and p.10).
6 M. Tomaszewski, W stronę muzykologii humanistycznej, op. cit., 21.
7 Tomaszewski mentions the ‘repossession’ ‘[...] of aspects of the scientific study of the mu­
sical work’. See M. Tomaszewski, ‘W stronę muzykologii humanistycznej’, op. cit., 15. The author 
also asks, on the next page of this text, if  ‘it is not worth trying to regain that which through 
the post-Hanslick paradigm was expelled from the domain of academic procedures This 
is a pertinent remark, although we should note that Kerman, from 1967 through to 1985, and 
also the ‘new musicologists’ of the late eighties pointedly drew attention to this need and shifted 
musicology in this very direction.
8 M. Tomaszewski, W stronę muzykologii humanistycznej, op. cit., 22.
The ‘solarity’ of the model proposed by Tomaszewski pervades not only the 
methodology and general premises of the possible recasting of musicology. It 
also pervades the whole of the discipline’s subject area, as is evident in particular 
where the author speaks of the ‘work’, ‘values’, ‘plenitude’ and ‘unity’, enmeshed in 
hierarchic, clear and seemingly obvious mutual relations. Additionally, the author 
notes that the whole of this area is encompassed ‘on each separate occasion by a dif­
ferent syndrome composed of such relations as static/dynamic, open/closed, dis- 
crete/non-discrete, objective/subjective, natural/artificial, natural/cultural, direct/ 
coded, sacred/profane, heroic/erotic, egalitarian/elitist, mimetic/absolute, artistic/ 
functional, aesthetic/ethical’ (p. 16). The invoking of such a configuration of no­
tions, set in traditional pairs of opposites, is intended to bring a certain conceptual 
neatness, which would counteract the excessive or chaotic nature of the artistic 
and cultural phenomena of the times conventionally termed ‘contemporary’. We 
know very well, today, that these pairs of opposites do not adequately order art 
and culture in relation to periods much more ‘balanced’ than our own (prior to the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century) and that such a proposition creates the os­
tensible impression that the defining of a precise axis of mutually polarised points 
of reference within a different syndrome each time gives us a satisfactoiy answer 
to the question of the ‘differentia specifica of the object under study’ (p. 15-16). 
As I see it, essentially all the pairs of notions are deserving of polemic, whilst their 
configurations may be multi-faceted, open to many possibilities, not just binary; 
they may be mutually reducible and they may even lose their raison d’être. If we 
adopt a scientistic interpretation of musicology, then music ought to be defined as 
a biocultural phenomenon, and so the nature/culture duality loses its traditional 
justification. If we consider the relations between the aesthetic and the ethical, then 
we easily observe that the fortunes of these notions not only meander today more 
than ever before, but they a’so succumb to mutual reduction. Universal processes 
of aestheticisation underm ne the ‘contrastively’ equiponderous roles of ethics 
and aesthetics. The renewal of aesthetics as a discipline in permanent crisis (anti­
aesthetics or aesthetics-post-aesthetics), meanwhile, is possible by pointing to its 
loci commune with ethics, as has already been observed by Soeren Kierkegaard, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Emanuel Levinas. When we take account of the most 
difficult problem of all, that of ‘objectivity/subjectivity’, then we see that in many 
views on art there is reference to a disturbance of the proportions between knowl­
edge about art and the belief that a given phenomenon or object can certainly be 
called art. One interesting observation in this respect is that of Boris Groys, who 
maintains that the modern work of art has the same logical structure as Jesus Christ 
in Kierkegaard’s interpretation, since, as the author of Either/Or asserts, ‘as a man 
he is no different to Jesus as God. We can no longer discern in him any attributes 
that would indicate his divinity. It can no longer be stated on the basis of outward 
manifestations whether Jesus is God or man. This is determined solely by the act of
faith [emphasis M. J.].’9 And the same applies to art: the act of faith plays a decisive 
role here, which also justifies confidence in the power of the absurd, which allows 
one, contrary to the laws of common sense, to consider every object as art. Finally, 
when we examine the debate about the crisis or depreciation or—completely differ­
ently—the growing role o f‘representation’ in contemporary art, and also in discourse 
on art, we see a new perspective that suppresses the ‘mimetic/absolute’ duality.
In order to account for my critical judgment on the solar model of musicology 
according to Tomaszewski, I shall employ a certain comparison by way of example. 
In a discreet polemic between two eminent Polish writers and thinkers, Ireneusz 
Kania and Zygmunt Kubiak, the question arises as to a criterion for constructing 
the canon of European literature, of fundamental significance for the identity of 
our culture. As is noted by Kania, whose point of view I fully accept, the canon put 
forward by Kubiak has a unilaterally solar character, as it excludes ‘dark’ works 
from the picture of European humanity and culture, from Parmenides, through 
the Marquis de Sade, to Emile Cioran and Philip Larkin (we speak here of men of 
letters, yet we may, without hesitation, consider Francis Bacon and his art as the 
patron of this side of culture in general and of contemporary culture in particular). 
By denying their significance and the role they play in our culture, we illicitly remove 
one of the elements of its binary foundation, namely contradiction. Contradiction as 
a positive value determines the specific identity of European culture in the sense that 
it guarantees a radical pluralism, giving priority to freedom over the oppressions 
which muzzle it, by exclusion or other means. And so culture, in its full diversity, 
cannot exclude any of its products, even the lethal, but should responsibly, in a free 
and critical way, correct their influence and significance among the users of culture 
by constructing alternatives. Scholarship, too, cannot exclude from its orbit even 
the most radical and isolated views. This is one of the fundamental parameters of 
open musicology, which, having rid itself of any selfish reasons guaranteeing its 
homogeneous and monochromatic inner picture, must seek intellectual justification 
for its multi-faceted research in the name of the above-mentioned contradiction.
It will not be an abuse if I say that musicology, as a discipline whose subject, 
music, fortunately has an exceptionally vague ontic status, is embracing with 
increasing determination many mutually contradictory—and not just comple­
mentary—musical practices in artistic creation and performance, including a va­
riety of hybrid forms in which contemporary culture abounds (e.g. in operatic 
theatre or pop culture, one random example of which is the ‘Rap Na Powstanie 
Warszawskie 1944’ [Rap for the Warsaw Rising, 1944]). There is also room within 
the scope of musicological enquiry for such phenomena as music and violence 
(the case of Marilyn Manson or Eminem) and the role of blasphemy in art (Ma­
donna’s ‘Like a Virgin’), which, appearing in the proximity of Olivier Messiaen’s
9 Konrad P. Liessmann, "Awangarda. O sztuce, wolności i odpowiedzialności" [Avant-garde. 
On art, freedom and responsibility] /secesja/3(2006): accessed February 2011. <www.secesja. 
info/liessmann >.
theological music, forge the counter-examples so characteristic of the polylogue of 
contemporary culture. Musicology, open and radical in some situations, must—if 
I may employ that hard modality—find tools and lexis for the interpretation of 
musical phenomena that are programmatically incoherent both in ‘high-brow’ 
production (if we accept this criterion as still apt) and also in all other areas of 
musical culture and phenomena governed by negative values (evil, ugliness, dis­
gust, scatological aesthetics, as in Life with an Idiot by Victor Erofeyev and Alfred 
Schnittke or La Grand Macabre by Michel de Ghelderode and Gyórgy Ligeti).
Tomaszewski writes: ‘Musicology is the study of—and at the same time critical 
reflection on—the musical work and of music in general, of the work as an artistic 
phenomenon and the work as a creative message: of the way in which it exists and 
the ways in which it functions in society, in time and space, that is, in history and 
culture.’(p. 10)10
One may clearly read from this definition certain characteristic features which 
affect the whole trajectory of Tomaszewski’s thinking in this and other texts devoted 
to musicology. A distinctly ‘contemporary’ motif that links many of the previously 
proposed definitions of musicology is the conviction of the need to expand the 
definition, to blur its boundaries; this supposedly results from musicology’s ever- 
expanding relations with other fields of learning. The inter- and transdisciplinary 
correlations which arise in this way weaken the dominant position of the ‘work’ in 
favour of all kinds of musical manifestation, of which the opus is just one of the 
possibilities. For Tomaszewski, however, the ‘opusie’ (‘ergonomic’) is that which 
is fundamental in musicological study, taking account of its sense, value, artistry 
and ‘unique objectivity’. The thesis of interpretation as ‘rising to the level of the 
work’ entails very serious obligations towards the intentio operis, situated at the 
tip of the hierarchy, and it also reveals musicology’s defensive attitude towards 
the usurping external methods which might weaken the central position of the 
ergon. But let us bear in mind that the expansion to include all kinds of musical 
manifestation that is proposed here shifts the point of gravity towards ‘man’ as 
creator, co-creator (many composers of a single work, the collective object of musi­
cal actions in non-European cultures, and also the artist-performer), user, author 
of various forms of the cultural circulation of those manifestations and participant 
in these processes. On the other hand, the essential notions, to which the no­
tion of the ‘work’ belongs, have, as a result of the multi-directional and dynamic 
changes in artistic practices over the last century, been axiologically degraded, 
semantically blurred and made dependent on the often arbitrary decisions of 
the subjects, the participants of musical culture. The picture of decomposition is
10 In my interpretation of this definition, I pass over one small detail, namely the for­
mulation ‘Musicology is the study of—and at the same time critical reflection on [...]’. Every 
academic discipline involves critical reflection, but I presume the author had in mind those areas 
of reflection—critical, of course—which are no longer, or not yet, science, irrespective of whether 
this concerns the distant past or contemporary times.
completed by the fact that it was in the twentieth century that the category of dés­
oeuvrement arose—the disinheritance of the ‘work’ from its traditionally perceived 
parameters, on which, as I understand it, Tomaszewski bases his conception. The 
development of the subject range of musicology, if only in this one area alone, the 
incorporation within it of musical manifestations and behaviours which we might 
call declared and actual anti-works, has moved musicology on to another level of 
discussion on the subject of its identity. And this is what Tomaszewski fails to notice.
Let us take a closer look at the ergonomic factor, and so the importance of 
the ‘particular and concrete musical work as the foundation of the discipline, as 
its constant and central point of reference’, (p. 11) I am of the conviction that the 
ontological questions of the musical work are settled for Tomaszewski, although 
I utter this thought with caution. Let us cast aside for a moment all those prod­
ucts of various artistic practices which are denied the status of the ‘work’, be it 
in the name of a radical aversion to all normativism, as a consequence of the 
countless failed attempts to fix unequivocal criteria—ontological or axiological—of 
the ‘work’, or due to the locating of such a criterion in the receiver’s individual act 
of decision, often based on belief, intuition or self-interest. Even then, rejecting 
most contemporary output (which I treat here as a momentaiy and theoretical 
gesture), the problem of the ontology of the ‘work’, including the musical ‘work’, 
is not rendered free from doubts and reservations, to such an extent that Aaron 
Ridley postulates the complete rejection of the ontology of the musical work in 
favour of its aesthetic. Tomaszewski stands at the opposite pole to Ridley, of 
course. His ontological considerations are derived almost wholesale from Roman 
Ingarden’s theory, located chiefly in his The Work o f Music and the Problem o f its 
Identity,11 from the enquiry conducted by this eminent Polish philosopher (a pupil 
of Edmund Husserl) into the essence of the work. The structure of this theory 
also allows Tomaszewski to formulate conclusions regarding the way in which 
the musical work becomes established and functions in culture; I shall return to 
this question shortly.
Tomaszewski is also unusually attached to the thesis of the importance of ‘the 
particular and concrete musical work’. I agree entirely with the author that the 
‘problem of individuality’ cannot be overestimated and that the stance which ensues 
from such a conviction is shared by both musicologists and scholars of other art 
forms. That which is unique, apart and irreducible, which encloses the fortuitous 
existence of a given object, constitutes a manifestation of the work of haecceitas.12 
That final completion o f‘essence’ in a particular thing is, as Duns Scotus would have 
it, the effect of the action of ‘individuation’, whereby an entity possesses not only 
a generic model but also its concrete particularity and by the same stroke differs
11 Roman Ingarden, The Work o f  Music and the Problem o f its Identity, trans. Adam Czer­
niawski (Barkeley, 1986).
12 Mariusz Giygianiec, Identyczność i trwanie. Studia ontologiczne [Identity and duration. 
Ontological studies] (Warsaw, 2007), 136-140.
as an individual from all other individuals of that same kind. We are interested 
here in what defines the uniqueness of a thing, and also its self-containedness, 
the ontological mystery concealed within the individual object or phenomenon.
As Gerard Hopkins observed, every such object, besides its distinctness, is 
equipped with an inner force, an energy, which not only enables that individuality 
to be integrated, but also allows us to sense and experience it.13 The tension between 
that which is general and, when we speak of ‘essence’, lasting and invariable, on 
one hand, and that which determines the individual completion and character of 
the work, on the other, creates much scope for polemic on the way in which works 
(or aesthetic objects in general) exist and the paths to their cognition—from radical 
empiricism to radical Platonism. The relationship between a work’s ‘essence’ and 
its individual ‘completion’ then becomes one of the central issues of philosophical 
thinking about music. It is clearly the essential aspect o f ‘something’ (music) that 
determines whether it is what it is. It is also clear that inasmuch as there exists 
at all something like the ‘essence of art’—and not that art (music) is ‘something 
which we call art (music) or ‘something’ which we believe to be art—it seems 
necessary to summon convincing arguments in favour of essentialism, with which, 
in light of the multitude of phenomena nowadays labelled ‘art’, many scholars 
wrestle in earnest... albeit without success. The adoption of an essentialist stance is 
associated with many inconveniences, particularly when the object of our inter­
est is contemporary artistic practice, the multiformity of the objects referred to 
as aesthetic objects and certain features of essentialism itself, which are treated 
distrustfully today. On one hand, the question of the ‘essence’ of art boils down 
to an answer to the question of the necessary and sufficient conditions that must 
be satisfied for us to consider a given object to be a work, although many philoso­
phers and aestheticians have now mollified their stance, enquiring merely of the 
necessary conditions of this relationship (Arthur Danto in his later works). The 
difficulties which arise from the postulate of showing the conditions of both kinds, 
those essential properties, also result from a lack of certainty as to whether there 
exists a genuine need to construct a general theory of art (nota bene Tomaszewski 
calls for just such a theory), and they are the effect of fundamental doubts over the 
possibility of defining essential properties. On the other hand, philosophers often 
raise the argument that essentialism is burdened with negative connotations; it 
is also sometimes treated as a dogma, and its advocates do not see the complexity 
of the world of art that surrounds us.14
An important role in Tomaszewski’s model, including from an ontological 
and methodological point of view, is played by the category of context. I have 
a fundamental doubt whether the proposed research method, which I would call’
13 Ewa Borkowska, "Pojęcie inscape w poetyce Gerarda Manley Hopkinsa" [The notion of the 
‘inscape’ in the poetic of Gerard Manley Hopkins], in Interpretacja i style krytyki [Interpretation 
and styles of criticism] ed. Wojciech Kalaga, (Katowice, 1988), 88-89, 9 0 .
14 See Arthur Danto, After the End o f  Art (Princeton, 1997), 139.
additive’, guarantees the anticipated unity of the work and does not distort the 
significance of context. Tomaszewski suggests that ‘the object [is] interpreted [...] 
at first immanently [...], but immediately after that also contextually’ [emphasis 
M. J.] (p. 11). This issue is worth investigating against the wider background that 
is created by the dispute between advocates of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ methods 
in the humanities. Quite some time has passed since the decision suspending, or 
even resolving, that dispute in favour of a communicational method as broadly 
understood, possessing the capacity to integrate the two aforementioned points of 
view. Whilst internal methods were based on the notion of autonomous structure, 
composition, construction or form, analysing all references to reality lying ‘beyond’ 
the work and apt to have any kind of influence upon it, external methods employed 
prescriptions deriving from historical, psychological or social geneticism and de­
terminism. The communicational method provides a solution which reconciles 
the two sides of the methodological debate. It posits that the ‘internal’ and the 
external belong to the work to an equal degree, as they are coupled together by the 
category of the receiver. The receiver, in the ontological sense, is not ‘something’ 
that is located outside the work, but rather ‘belongs’ to the work. Designed into each 
work is an addressee of its communicational message. The encoding of the content 
which constitutes that message, meanwhile, takes place through operations on the 
syntactic-semantic relations known to and understood or sensed by the emitter 
and-in  the process of interpretation-recognised to a greater or lesser extent by 
a real receiver, who is the concrétisation of the ‘schematic’ receiver inscribed in the 
design of the work. Of course, the ‘schematic’, ‘ideal’ or ‘imagined’ receiver may be 
exclusively an object of research and theoretical interpretations, yet each of these 
interpretations must take account of the fact that the structural-functional side of 
that object is one of two sides, the other being the real receiver, whose interpreta­
tions obviously represent concrétisations of the model designed by the author.
An analogous situation exists with context, which in some contemporary 
theories ceases to function as additional knowledge about the work in respect to 
the events, facts and processes, etc. which brought the work into existence and 
accompanied it on its cultural trajectoiy. In the tradition of humanistic thought, 
including in musicology, there occur many stances according to which work and 
context are clearly and unambiguously distinguished. This sort of isolation­
ism, respecting the autonomy of cultural objects and thereby guaranteeing the 
objective assessment of their place and significance within that culture, must con­
front accusations of the artificial separation of objects from their context, and also 
of cognitive idealism. We arrived at a change to this traditional way of thinking 
from different directions, whilst contextualisms are manifold, and they all (and 
not they alone) run aground on a reef of reflections both on their place within 
humanistic cognition as broadly understood and on the problem of values, which 
they absorb to varying effect. I shall mention here just two solutions: one provided 
by semiotics, the other associated with the new historicism of Stephen Greenblatt.
In the case in hand, semioticists speak essentially about a specific sign 
communication. This is unintentional communication, since every musical work 
communicates ‘something’ about the context, situation, time or circumstances 
which gave rise to it, which surround it or to which it always ‘somehow’ refers. 
Of course, one must also consider the case of intentional communication, since 
the composer may consciously, with a particular purpose in mind—more or less 
specified, directly or allusively—communicate about some state of affairs. We can 
say that the music of a particular composer or era always contains signs which 
indicate or allow us to determine features of the culture or environment from 
which that music comes and in which it functions. Thus context is not something 
added to a work in its immanence, a category which admittedly elucidates some, 
or even many, of the work’s mysteries but lies outside the work and constitutes 
a subsidiary source of knowledge about it. Context is the ‘cultural space of the work’, 
inscribed within it as an irremovable part of the work’s ontology, guaranteeing its 
comprehensive—which does not always mean full—understanding.
Greenblatt, meanwhile, states that ‘the work of art is [...] the product of a 
negotiation between a creator or a class of creators, equipped with a complex, 
communally shared repertoire of conventions, and the institutions or practices 
of society’.15 From the point of view of the composer, the active participant in this 
negotiation, we can speak of an intended context, intentionally important and given 
to the interpretational endeavours of the work’s receivers. Such a context would 
be—one may assume—conventionally presented in a deliberate way, with the use 
of specific means, the correct reading of which is possible if, of course, we assume 
the existence of rules of interpretation that justify it. The constituted context, 
meanwhile, will concern the reader’s interpretational behaviours, placing the work 
within a set of circumstances—different each time, or unique—which determine its 
place in the social discourse. A separate problem arises when we wish to interpret 
the relations into which the two kinds of context enter, as well as the relationship 
between different theories of context, seen, in particular, in light of the values which 
pertain to them and the criteria of evaluation which constitute, in the opinion of 
some scholars, a more primary problem than ontological or cognitive questions.
On the question of values, I shall merely signal that Tomaszewski in his 
conception, and not just in the text under discussion, postulates the return of axiol­
ogy to ‘the fold of musicological interests’ (p. 11). I consider this postulate to be one 
of the most important expectations of every humanistic discipline, and decidedly 
instructive, as Tomaszewski makes it, for musicology. The question of whether the 
problem of values, understood in a variety of ways, was expelled with greater or 
lesser energy from the ‘fold of musicological interests’ in the past or was reinstated 
within it is chiefly a function of the working of the model of ‘returns’ (Giambattista
15 Mary Hunter and James Webster, Introduction to Opera buffa in Mozart’s Vienna (Camb­
ridge, 1997), 7-8.
Vico, La Scienza Nuova, 1725-44) within the paradigms of disciplines for which 
one of the fundamental criteria of distinction (science/non-science) and division 
(natural/human sciences) was and is the attitude towards values and valuation 
(a similar fate befalls the notion of expression).16 Tomaszewski speaks of an ebbing 
and flowing of interest in the question of value in musicology, which seems wholly 
understandable insofar as we treat changes in scholarly attitudes and paradigms 
as a cyclical phenomenon. Besides this, there exists, as I have written, the problem 
of the way in which we understand values and their mutual relations and situating 
in respect to the object (action), whilst one should bear in mind that such a state of 
affairs, the attainment of which requires even an unconditional dissociation from 
any sort of axiological qualification of an object (action), may also be a value, since 
axiological neutrality is also an attitude towards value. Moreover, it also occurs that 
the value of a given action is identified with the aim it is intended to achieve, whilst 
the value of a particular object is identified with its sense or significance in culture, in 
the system of the arts, or in social reception. After all, alongside questions of values 
and their relations to the object, that is, music (musical manifestations), we also pose 
the question of the problem of value in relation to every academic discipline, chiefly 
in respect to its potential or actual inter- and transdisciplinary connections: from 
questions of the neutrality of scholarship and its freedom from values, through its 
social character, which assumes axiological implications, to the ethical dimension 
of science and the restoration of the role of the committed subject of study.
The fact that we speak increasingly often of a return to values in musicologi- 
cal enquiry, as Tomaszewski notes with a hint of satisfaction, does not determine
16 The problem of expression holds a significant place in Tomaszewski’s theoretical 
proposition (see W stronę muzykologii humanistycznej, op. cit., 17 ff and W stronę interpre­
tacji integralnej, 56-58). The main thesis of the first principle of the integral method can be 
reduced to the necessity, postulated by Tomaszewski, of intensifying research into expression, 
incorporating such research in the canon of interpretational procedures, as a complementary 
activity in respect to the study of the structure of the work’ (57-58). There is no doubting that 
the concentration on expression in musicological study is one of the priorities, and contem­
porary musicology remembers about it when carrying out its tasks. This occurs both within 
traditional, humanistically-orientated musicology and also in musicology which draws upon the 
natural sciences. Humanists, Tomaszewski included, seldom refer in this matter to the unque­
stionable and interesting—including for musicology—conceptions of the naturalists, although 
from various perspectives this research has been carried on since the eighties. It should be 
remembered, however, that the term ‘expression’ appears there most commonly in the phrase 
musical expression of emotions’ and concerns research into communication, and especially 
emotional communication (the accent is on the emotions). From an academic point of view, 
as, for example, Alf Gabrielsson and Erik Lindstrom write, two questions are involved: What 
emotions can be aptly expressed in music? and What elements in music are responsible for the 
correct reception of these emotions? See A. Gabrielsson and E. Lindstrom, "The Influence of 
Musical Structure on Emotional Expression", in, Music and Emotion: Theory and Research, P. 
N. Juslin and J. Sloboda (eds.) (Oxford, 2001), 223. Other ways of understanding the notion of 
‘expression’ are mentioned in the main text.
how they are to be approached, what role they are to be ascribed in various aca­
demic points of view and how we see the relationship between the axiological and 
ontological status of the ‘work’ and of all other kinds of musical manifestation. 
These questions take on greater weight when musicology ponders the reorienta­
tion of its object of study, involving the direction of attention towards music as 
performance, and also towards the sphere of musical meanings and their interpreta­
tions, as broadly understood. Irrespective of all these important, although frequently 
complex, issues, two of them are of fundamental significance. The first concerns 
the relationship of the ontology of the work (musical manifestation) and its value, 
most commonly aesthetic (Aaron Ridley), but also ethical (Maciej Jabłoński); the 
second concerns the relationship of value and the criteria of valuation.
Tomaszewski demands, with justifiable determination, that musicology 
reincorporate expression into the scope of its study of the work, having eliminated 
it hitherto for various reasons, and especially “[...] due to the anxiousness to main­
tain the “scientific character” of its scholarly procedures’.17 However, the approach 
proposed by Tomaszewski requires a brief explanation. He does not consider the 
notion of expression from the point of view of its fundamental feature: polysemic­
ity. This is a question of particular weight in that, depending on how we under­
stand the specific way of communicating that is expression, we may speak of three 
groups of approach. In my text devoted to music as a means of communication, 
I write the following: ‘advocates of the first approach recognise in expression the 
expression o f some states o f affairs, above all mental states (emotions, moods, 
feelings). Advocates of the second approach see expression as a process o f evoking 
(arousing, stimulating, generating) mental states in the receiver. Finally, repre­
sentatives of the third approach treat expression as a state o f affairs involving the 
ascribing to a given object of mental traits, by means of anthropomorphisation, of 
“emphasising”, or else as a result of properties objectively found in the object. Thus 
we say, for example, that Ludwig van Beethoven’s sonata is “pathétique” because 
a) it is a sign of “exaltedness”, b) it is “exalted”, because it evokes specific rela­
tions, or c) it is “exalted”, just as a person can be “exalted”.’18 And so expression 
may be a special case of representation (a face in a portrait expresses anger, but 
at the same time we can say that anger is represented through particular artistic 
means) and may also signify action, especially the evoking of particular emotional 
states (we say that a performance of a given work is expressive, is full of expres­
sion, and so that it evokes in the receiver particular emotional states associated 
with the content which the receiver labels ‘expressive’). In a certain sense, another 
dynamic meaning—albeit derived from evocation—of the notion of expression is 
impression, which concerns exclusively the effects which music causes, the arous-
17 M. Tomaszewski, W stronę muzykologii humanistycznej, op. cit., 17.
18 M. Jabłoński, "Music as a Medium of Communication. Two Visions of Musicology" (with 
Piotr Podlipniak), Interdisciplinary Studies in Musicology, 7 (2008), 33.
ing of reactions and attitudes, the determining of gestures, deeds and behaviour 
(when an anthem is played in a concert, expressivity is associated with patriotic 
content, whilst impressivity stirs us to react—we stand up).
Initiating his deliberations on ‘integral interpretation’, Tomaszewski draws an 
appealing image of a plurality of views in musicology referring to the multitude of 
methods employed and to the fact that while each of them admittedly brings to the 
subject ‘an aspect, facet or moment’ of the existence of a work, none of them-there 
is no other way of understanding this—apprehends the work in its ‘plenitude, draws 
nearer to its essence or reads its message’. Instead, it ‘isolates’, ‘reduces’, ‘selects’ 
and ‘does not suffice’ (p. 49). ‘Thus dissatisfaction with the feeling of insufficiency 
is a fact, writes Tomaszewski, indeed quite rightly, although we know very well that 
a lack of satisfaction occurring as a result of the insufficiency of methods and tools 
and their progressive cognitive sterility is not untypical of the situation of scholar­
ship, especially during the second half of the twentieth centuiy (p. 50). Since such 
is the case, since the clear majority of the methods hitherto applied in musicology 
render us blind to values, then the postulate of formulating a method which would 
treat the work in an integral way, taking into account all the aforementioned param­
eters, with the axiological to the fore, is justified. In order to be realised cognitively, 
the ‘integral interpretation’ should, on one hand, ‘take account of everything that 
has been discussed’ and, on the other, ‘rise to the level of the work’ (p. 55). The 
two conditions enumerated by Tomaszewski form a modal framework for further 
detailed propositions. As has already been said, Tomaszewski is a firm advocate 
of musicology which places the musical work at the centre of its thinking, which 
treats the intentio operis as related to the intentio auctoris, and he does all of this 
in a methodologically traditional way. He consistently and deliberately employs 
such terms as the work ‘per se’, ‘in itself or ‘as such’, regardless of the fact that it 
would be extremely difficult to indicate how a work understood in this way exists, 
and—more importantly—that he does not prove as much within this conception. 
This is an issue of perhaps fundamental weight, as it concerns the relations between 
the object and the subject of cognition, and especially the question of whether the 
object (work) is ‘dependent’ or ‘independent’ in respect to cognition. The rank 
of this issue rises when we note that Tomaszewski clearly postulates ‘the need 
to “listen intently” to the work “as such”, to contemplate it’, and so not avoiding 
epistemological questions, (p. 55) On the question of the subject-object cognitive 
relationship, Jacek Juliusz Jadacki enumerates three possible stances, defined in 
various ways by particular philosophers, which boil down to the acknowledgement 
or not of (1) the self-containedness (non-self-containedness), (2) dependence 
(independence) and (3) autonomy (non-autonomy) of the object in relation to 
the subject. Thus we ask whether an object-work ‘in itself is self-contained, that 
is, it does not lose its existence when it ceases to be cognised, or that the opposite 
is true: the object is not self-contained, that is, it loses its existence when it ceases 
to be cognised. We ask also whether an object is dependent, which means that the
object-subject cognitive relationship brings changes in the object; contrarily, we 
will say that ‘an object is independent when no change or property in the subject af­
fects the state of the object’.19 Finally, we enquire whether an object is autonomous, 
meaning that it is separate from the subject, that it belongs to the extra-subjective 
world. Non-autonomy, with a premise worded in this way, would concern solely 
the subject’s own experiences.20
Regardless of what, as a result of our considerations, the answer will be to 
the question of the self-containedness, dependence and autonomy of the object 
(work) in respect to the cognitive subject, I would like to know whether, on this 
question of the work ‘in itself, Tomaszewski is in any measure a Kantist, which 
would signify that the work ‘in itself was for him and for us outside the bounds 
of cognition, as a noumenal entity. Such an entity lies beyond our awareness, 
although it is the cause of a variety of states; perhaps, then, the author of the con­
cept o f‘integral interpretation’ is a continuator of phenomenological thinking? Yet 
it would not be out of place to ask to what extent Ingarden’s views on the musi­
cal work are dependent on the theses contained in his Spór o istnienie świata21 
and Das literarische Kunstwerk22 and what influence this fact has on the work 
of the musicologist. Or perhaps Tomaszewski is—although I do not believe so—a 
Platonist, like Peter Kivy. However, from a whole succession of utterances on this 
subject we may deduce that we are dealing here with the direction of essentialist 
thinking where vertical motion—‘rising to the level of the work’—is a metaphor 
serving its apotheosis. Tomaszewski admits that this rising which the interpreter 
is to undertake conditions his arrival ‘at the essence of the thing’, thereby serving 
the success of the integral interpretation itself (p. 55) For this reason, at least, one 
should surmise that the definitions of the work which I cite after Tomaszewski 
have in his conception a more ethical than ontological status.
At this point, we come to another problem, one which I see as fundamental to 
the whole concept of ‘integral interpretation’. I admit that ethical arguments in 
favour of the existence of the work ‘as such’, as was the case with E. D. Hirsch’s 
strategy for the defence of the status and significance of the intention auctoris,23 
for example, can be understood, albeit not necessarily shared. However, it is dif­
ficult to accept the statement that ‘the method of integral interpretation assumes 
the need to “listen intently” to a work, “as such”, its contemplation, but at the
19 Jacek J. Jadacki, "Spor o granice poznania. Prolegomena do epistemologii" [The dispute 
over the limits of cognition. A prolegomenon to epistemology] (Warsaw, 1985), 87-104.
20 Ibid.
21 R. Ingarden, Spor o istnienie swiata [Dispute over the existence of the world], vol. i (Kra­
kow, 1947), vol. ii (Krakow, 1948).
22 R. Ingarden, Das literatrische Kunstwerk. Bine Untersuchung aus dem Gremgebiet der 
Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft (Halle, 1931).
23 Eric D. Hirsch, ‘In Defence of the Author’, in Validity in Interpretation (New Haven, 
1967), 1-23.
same time to look at it from a couple of complementary perspectives, which offer 
a chance of reading what the work has to say to us’ (pp. 55-56). We have here 
a certain contradiction, the full explanation of which would require discussion 
with the author, as we do not find it in his texts about ‘integral interpretation’. 
Tomaszewski writes about the contemplation of the work ‘as such’ as a condition 
for the success of his method, whilst on the other hand stating that ‘at the same 
time’ the work should be the object of inspection ‘from a couple of complemen­
tary perspectives’, at which we may arrive by employing appropriate principles: 
complementarity, ontological plenitude, contextuality and hiérarchisation. Thus, 
there occurs a situation in which the contemplation of a work ‘in itself is ac­
companied at the same time by its inspection from perspectives which radically 
invalidate contemplation. These numerous paths to cognition which should be 
trodden in order to take in the fullness of the work are contrary to contemplation, 
although they are undoubtedly attractive and bring us invaluable knowledge about 
the work. Yet they lead not only to different cognitive effects, but also give different 
‘pictures’ of the work. Contemplation, linked by Arthur Schopenhauer to aesthetic 
experience, forces one to meet particular conditions, as it is disinterested, whereas 
experience is an aim in itself. It is isolating, passive (the passivity of contemplation 
was opposed by Ingarden, close to Tomaszewski with his ontology) and demands 
total concentration. We also talk of contemplation as being ‘inactive’, perception 
that is immediate and dispassionate and such that holds attention on the object 
completely and for a long time.
Now let us take a brief look at those perspectives and their defining 
principles, on which the construct of Tomaszewski’s conception rests. He writes: 
‘(1) The principle o f complementarity. This is intended to prevent one-sidedness 
in scholarship. It postulates that we take account of—to put it metaphorically—the 
other side of the coin. And so not only the logos, but also the ethos of the work. (2) 
The principle o f ontological plenitude. This is directed against the fragmentary 
perspectives on the work that have hitherto held sway. In most general terms, we 
are talking about seeing the work in all the natural phases of its existence within the 
space of culture, from conception to reception. (3) The principle o f contextuality. 
This opposes the excessive isolation of the work. It postulates considering the work 
within its organic context: biographical, historical and cultural. (4) The principle 
ofhierarchism. This prevents an excessive axiological relativisation of the work. It 
opposes the omission—when considering the work—of the sphere of its value and 
sense’ (p. 56) Let us note at once that the principles to which Tomaszewski ascribes 
such weight and significance are essentially ‘soft’. Their ‘softness’ derives from the 
fact that 1) they are not sufficiently precise (the author—in principle 1—speaks of 
logos and ethos, but does not mention what significations of these notions he has in 
mind, and he also overlooks—why?—pathos. The rhetorical perspective illuminat­
ing the meaning of these notions ascribes pathos a crucial role in the process and 
success of persuasion), 2) Tomaszewski employs such terms as ‘natural phases of
existence’ (principle 2) and ‘organic context: biographical, historical and cultural’ 
(principle 3), as if they were universally binding, for all forms of musical art. Yet 
we do not know why these and not other (all?) phases of a work’s existence would 
be ‘natural’ and what this means, all the more so since one can easily point to 
examples which do not fulfil these phases, 3) Tomaszewski employs terms which 
relativise and ‘soften’, which weaken the grounds of the particular principles. This 
occurs when the author writes of the ‘excessive isolation of the work’ (principle 
3) or the ‘excessive axiological relativisation of the work’ (principle 4). But when 
does the excessive isolation of the work begin and when does it end? Is it when 
we pass over, for some reason—for example, the lack of data justifying the hy­
pothesis-one of the contexts, for instance the biographical? Isolation is linked to 
a question persistently raised by many scholars, that of the autonomy of the work, 
whilst the role of a common denominator which would unite the views in this area 
(autonomy is spoken of in respect to the laws governing the realm of art, the genesis, 
structure and value of the work, the method of interpretation and the modes of 
evaluation) makes it impossible to achieve consent on the question of the criteria 
on which at least a temporary definition of these notions could be constructed. We 
also ask—and an answer in this area is even more difficult to come by than in the 
one before—what is meant by the ‘excessive axiological relativisation of the work’? 
Does the ‘excess’ in this case concern the removal of the problem of value from 
the field of vision of musicology in general? Or perhaps it rather constitutes a sort 
of warning against attempts to bring into question the principle of hierarchism in 
axiological matters? If so, then on what grounds are we to obey these and not any 
other value-determining hierarchies and criteria? Do historical criteria alone suf­
fice in this area, as some historians and musicologists maintain? Besides this, in 
the margins, the problem of value does not necessarily have to be a problem of the 
‘value of the work’, as Tomaszewski suggests. It may also, for example, be the ‘value 
of resonance’, which can be a complex product of the cognition and experiencing of 
the work by individual and collective receivers. Is axiology indeed inscribed—and 
if so, then in what way and to what extent (a sort of ‘excess’?)—in the work? Is it 
a consequence of cognitive processes and—following that—of the sanction which 
the community or culture produces? Does the restriction introduced by principle 
4 apply also to the problem of the reduction of values, for example aesthetic to 
ethical or vice versa? Finally, ‘sense’ (‘meaning’, sometimes identified simply with 
the ‘values’ or ‘purposes’ of art) can be possessed by a work that contradicts all the 
principles, phases and aspects on which Tomaszewski builds his conception. Such 
a work would, therefore, be ‘senseless’ or would have a different (what?) sense to 
that which we infer when examining the principles that undergird the ‘integral 
interpretation’?
From a sensitive reading of the discussions of the principles which, as 
I understand it, delimit these perspectives on the work as the object of contempla­
tion, I conclude that Tomaszewski’s conception may be termed a spotlight concep-
tion o f the musical work and o f its analysis and interpretation founded on the 
postulate o f an adequate method, strongly historically orientated and ethically 
inflected; it is also a conception soi-disant progressive but in fact retrospective, 
which does not necessarily attest its weakness, particularly when we take into ac­
count the axiological dimension to Tomaszewski’s methodological thinking. How­
ever, it cannot be said of this method that it is a method for ‘integral interpretation’, 
since l) the author does not stipulate what he understands by the term integrity 
or integral interpretation; this we can only assume; 2) these assumptions do not 
bring an unequivocal answer to the questions and do not dispel the doubts which 
are engendered by the content of pt 1; 3) a reconstruction of the concept does not 
enable us to call it ‘integral’, and my proposal of a rather long-winded name is a sort 
of makeshift, showing in descriptive mode what is important in that conception. 
Explaining that makeshift name for Tomaszewski’s conception, I would say that 
the postulate o f an adequate method is expressed directly in this conception and 
ensues from a diagnosis of the state of musicology in respect to the understanding 
and the treating of the analysis and interpretation of the musical work and a deep 
conviction that this state is unsatisfactory, with which we can concur. If, however, 
we are prepared to admit that scholarship is subject to change and that the life of 
paradigms is delimited by the phases of normality, that is, the action of the given 
paradigm, and by ruptures in the phases in the form of revolutions (Thomas 
Kuhn) or catastrophes (Rene Thom), then the appearance of a new paradigm, for 
instance as a consequence of the postulate of an adequate method, and so one 
which would establish the state of affairs ‘once and for all’, is neither possible nor 
surely desirable (since the adequacy of one approach would place a question mark 
beside another approach or interpretation which, on different grounds, would also 
claim the right to adequacy). Tomaszewski is of the opinion that from the premise 
of the need to seek an adequate method there ensue specific consequences for 
the obligation of musicology, as he also expresses directly. This is to be served 
by such steps as defining musicology, delimiting its optimal subject range (the 
way in which Tomaszewski understands the category of the ‘work’), indicating 
the neglected areas (value, expression, context, etc.) and the need to engage with 
other disciplines, yet with the proviso that the aims of the human sciences (in the 
traditional sense of the term) and the natural sciences are essentially divergent 
and that their cooperation may be of only meagre benefit to musicologists. Yet 
most important of all are the reasons for which I call Tomaszewski’s conception 
‘spotlight’ and not ‘integral’. For me, there is no doubt that the key to solving this 
problem is the author’s understanding of the principle o f ontological plenitude 
(pp. 58-60). Thus Tomaszewski again reminds us of his favoured theory of the 
musical work as formulated by Ingarden, of its basic notions o f ‘intentional object’, 
‘concrétisation’ and ‘indeterminateness’, creating, on the basis of these notions, the 
thesis that ‘the musical work as a phenomenon manifesting itself in the space of 
culture’ (p. 58) is of a phasically differentiated character. Writing about phasical-
ity as the way in which the musical work manifests itself in culture, Tomaszewski 
states that ‘in each of them the interpreter encounters a different kind of object of 
study (in semiotic terminology, a different kind of “text”)’.24
One crucial element in the study of the progress of human knowledge which is 
revealed by this and further passages from Tomaszewski’s article is the attempt to 
reconcile notions or categories, with the aim of harmonising ideas from different 
philosophical sources into a single coherent line of reasoning. The incorporation of 
semiotic terminology, specifically the notion of the ‘text’, which has an extremely 
wide-ranging polysemy, without indicating what way of interpreting he has in mind, 
when the author speaks of the interchangeability of the terms ‘a different kind 
of object of study’ / ‘a different kind of “text”’ arouses interest, since semioticity, 
and in particular a semiotic understanding of the ‘text’, would be quite apt here 
if from this methodological decision, and not a simple equivalence of terms, we 
drew consequences, for example, for the articulation of the role of the receiver and 
the interpretation of the aesthetic object in the process of cognising the musical 
work. If Tomaszewski, at the very beginning of his argumentation which initiates 
a description of the phases and of the terminology ascribed to them, designates 
a semiotic point of reference for each of the ‘texts’ (there are four phases and four 
texts), then those consequences could encompass all the phases/texts, and not just 
the final phase, when reference is made to the ‘sign object, that is, the symbolic text’. 
However, since that is his choice, I would willingly ask why ‘sign’=’symbolic’ and 
not, for example, ‘iconic’, given that—say—‘reception’, ‘decoding’ and ‘verbalisation’ 
through and within the framework of a given culture may concern a relationship 
of an iconic or indexical character, or all at the same time (indeed, such an order 
would give that ‘moment of integrity’ which is sought by Tomaszewski in his con­
ception, as it is based on the integral function of the triad in Charles S. Peirce’s
24 It is not clear to me why Tomaszewski introduces here the notion of the ‘text’, availing 
himself of its semiotic interpretation. Semiotics generally understands the ‘text’ as a sort of macro- 
-unit, governed by specific generative rules, not infrequently absorbing the elementary- level units 
that are signs. See Umberto Eco, A Theory o f Semiotics (Bloomington, 1979), 12 (we might also 
turn, for example, to Lotman’s definition of the text: Juri Lotman, Struktura tekstu artystycz­
nego, trans. Anna Tanalska (Warsaw, 1984), 76-81 [Eng. trans, as The Structure o f  the Artistic 
Text, trans. Gail Lenhoff and Ronald Vroon, Michigan Slavic Contributions, 7 (Ann Arbor)]). Let 
us remember that the problem of the ‘text’ is vividly present, for example, in anti-structuralist 
semiotics, thanks to Roland Barthes, who, nota bene, wrote many times on the subject of music. 
Let us note, however, that the clear separation of ‘work’ and ‘text’ has extensive consequences. 
In the case of the ‘work’, we have either the standard philological reading or a context-anchored 
hermeneutic reading. The interdisciplinariness of Barthes’s approach, with its concentration 
on the ‘text’, shows its inexhaustible energy, since the ‘text’ is in constant motion, continually 
produced and reproduced in readers’ interpretations. The theory of the text, as Barthes sees it, 
‘brings with it [...] the promotion of a new epistemological object: the reading. [...] Full reading 
[...] is the kind in which the reader is nothing less than the one who desires to write, to give 
himself up to an erotic practice of language.’ See Roland Barthes, The Theory o f  the Text, trans. 
Robert Young in his Untying the Text (Boston and London, 1981), 42.
system of the triad of the Categories and semiotic triads/trychotomies). Meaning­
fulness (and thence meaning-creativeness) appears at all the stages or phases of 
cognition, even those which do not participate in the conscious and rationalised 
part of the whole complex process about which Tomaszewski writes: from the 
genesis of the work to its function and role in culture and in the transcultural 
circulation of musical codes and meanings.
I am also intrigued by the division of the process in which the musical work 
‘manifests itself in the space of culture’. The organisation of this process, which 
assumes four phases, constitutes an economical model, ousting from our field of 
vision other phases w hich-as might perhaps be acceptable to Tomaszewski, in­
clined as he is towards hierarchic thinking-would create with the phases originally 
proposed a sort of hierarchic arrangement. I would see such a ‘new’ organisation 
of phases supported by certain criteria which I would most readily construct on 
triads, of which one of the elements would always bear the name ‘between’ (the 
Platonic metaxu). This attempt might not quickly succeed, however, as the ‘between’ 
will be rejected by the proponents of scientism, whilst conciliatory methodologi­
cal centrists will be amused by the time lost on seeking it. ‘Between’ signifies here 
fluidity, ‘not yet one thing, but already not another’, ‘transition’, ‘instability’, but 
also ‘mediation’ and ‘boundary crossing’. Finally: ‘intermediacy’;25 let us just recall 
that this is precisely the cognitive situation that Heinrich Heine had in mind when 
defining music as a poetical intermediary ‘between’ spirit and matter. Thomas L. 
Elliot apotheoses ‘between’ in his The Hollow Man:26
Between the idea 
A nd the reality 
Between the motion 
A nd the act 
Falls the shadow  
[...]
Between the conception 
A n d the creation 
Between the emotion 
A nd the response 
Falls the shadow  
[-]
So we would be dealing with a sense of dwindling, of the subsiding of a given 
segment of one phase and the rising of the next, which in its stabilised part will
25 ‘The mode that is proper to existence is intermediacy -  and we will never be capable of 
distinguishing whether it is a mode of cognition or being../, Andrzej Falkiewicz Istnienie i me­
tafora [Existence and metaphor] (Warsaw, 1996), 427.
26 Thomas L. Elliot, „The Hollow Man” (1925), In: The Complete Poems and Plays of T.L.Elliot, 
(London, 1969), 83-86.
take on a quite easily recognisable profile (for example, the phase of creation is 
certainly divided into the pre-conceptional and conceptional sub-phases; the 
participation of consciousness is decisive here, and so their theoretical, at least, 
differentiation is apt and justified).
In writing about a ‘phase of conception’, in which ‘the work is an intentional 
object, i.e. the musical text constituted by the composer’, Tomaszewski effects 
the following procedures: a) he equates, for reasons unknown, the Ingardenian 
intentional object with the semiotic interpretation of the musical text, b) he over­
looks the constitutive role of the schema, at both the stage of creation and in that 
‘between’ which links the composer designing the schema with the performers/ 
receivers who concretise that schema. The possibility o f ‘fleshing out’ the schema 
and the way in which the subjectively active concrétisation takes place connect 
the sphere of performance (the phase of artistic realisation) with the sphere of 
reception (the phase of aesthetic perception), but also distinguishes them. The 
activity of the performer, who ‘brings [the work] to life’, does not correspond to 
a lack of activity on the part of the receiver, in whom, allegedly, ‘some tonal text 
of the work is constituted’, and nothing more. (p. 58) These two phases are filled 
with activity on the part of admittedly most often different subjects, equipped 
with different cognitive tools, competences, habits, preferences or value systems, 
but in both cases they are sense-generative activities, as in the case of the com­
poser. To treat the receiver as a subject who merely decodes, without imparting 
to the messages/signs sent by the composer his own meanings, often impossible 
to foresee, is to belittle the problem of ‘musical sense’ as a domain of the whole 
of man’s musical activity. It would be worth, therefore, following through this 
crucial thread, as it unquestionably—insofar as we demand it—serves to integrate 
the entire process, all the phases. Finally, the phase of conception (as the name 
suggests) does not take account of the fact that part of the creative process has 
an unconscious character, and so we cannot speak o f ‘conception’. Let us further 
draw attention to the fact that Tomaszewski completely passes over the admittedly 
extremely complex question of the ‘source’ of art/the work which ‘lies’ beyond the 
phase of conception—understood as the intuitively-intellectually decisive phase: 
the aim, the strategy, the choice of means and their coherence—that contains 
a complex of factors arising from these premises. Irrespective of how Ingarden—on 
whom Tomaszewski frequently relies—wrestles with this problem, it exists par­
ticularly there, where we examine the essential dimension of art and what Martin 
Heidegger discussed in his conception of the ‘Source’ (Ursprung), understood as 
the ‘beginning’, ‘genesis’, ‘provenance’, but also as an Enigma or Mystery which 
concerns not only the source but also that which issues from it.27 The sourceness 
of the work would be a universal and philosophically weighty question, the germ
27 Cezary Woźniak, Martina Heideggera myślenie sztuki [Martin Heidegger’s thinking on 
art] (Kraków, 1997), 109-117.
or nucleus of every—always unitary—creative process, the intricacies of which 
elude unequivocal cognition. For the scholar of interpretation, this question is of 
primary importance, since becoming an object generates the capacity for being 
a sign, although in order to become a sign an object must point to itself as a sign, 
must be ‘interpretable as a sign’. Wojciech Kalaga differentiates here inchoative 
interpretability, that is, pure, germinal interpretability, being a significational 
capacity (a source capacity, as we would say) from effective interpretability, and 
so ‘interpretability as’.28
The designation of the second phase (artistic realisation) and third phase 
(perception) as ‘emitting’ and the next two phases (perception and reception) as 
‘receiving’ is another oversystematic treatment of the content which stands behind 
these terms. Performance, artistic interpretation, is a process in which perception 
plays an equally important role as in the case of the receiver (non-performer), 
although it does serve other purposes. The tension ‘between’ the schema and 
the concretisation is of a dual nature here. At the same time it both results from 
the realisation of a certain theoretical premise which Ingarden formulated, but 
it also leads to the constituting of an aesthetic object in concreto. Thus emissive 
activity takes place along the path leading from the composer, through the work, the 
performer and the receiver in the direction of what we may generally and vaguely 
call reception, which concerns both the performer and the receiver. The receiver 
is inscribed in the work, as we know from the general tenets of communication 
theory, and the composer is also a receiver, relatively aware of the resonance 
of his music and also more or less actively coexisting with various forms of the 
circulation of art, which bring him knowledge of the system of the values shared 
within a given milieu, group or community. Of course, this simplified schema 
assumes the transparency of circulation and the clarity of forms, which in the case 
of many of the forms and institutions of contemporary culture, the overproduc­
tion of simulacra and the ubiquitous manipulation which renders the efficacy of 
communication dependent upon a compromise ‘between’ the person (composer, 
performer, receiver) and the code, is an almost unattainable effect (for example, 
the so-called ‘noise composers’ and music created from processed interference on 
recordings of traditional musical works).
The phase of reception is particularly—perhaps alongside the phase of 
‘conception’—debatable. Firstly, as already mentioned, we have here reference to 
semiotic terminology (sign object, symbolic text), from which Tomaszewski fails 
to draw quite obvious conclusions. Secondly, Tomaszewski clarifies cultural recep­
tion as intersubjective and objectivised. In cultural theories, these two words mean 
roughly the same, unless we assume that cultural products are in essence biocul- 
tural phenomena. I would prefer to speak of intersubjectivity and conventionality, 
since the second of these terms makes us aware of the crucial processes of the st
28 Wojciech Kalaga, Mgławice dyskursu [Fuzzy discourse] (Kraków, 2001), 143.
abilisation-»conventionalisation / destabilisation-»deconventionalisation of the 
actions and products of culture, and so a) refers to strictly cultural processes, b) 
defines the field of activity within the scope of the norm or system and indicates 
when and in what circumstances the artist declares himself against norms and sys­
tems, c) allows us to observe changes to that which Boris Asafiev calls the musical 
intonational dictionary of the era and d) reveals the germs of new criteria for the 
valuation of some artistic phenomena to the detriment of others.
Thirdly, I am interested by the processes of verbalisation about which 
Tomaszewski writes so laconically. The question of language on music, be it from 
the perspective of its historical changes and opposing paradigms, the angle of 
the dominance of the ‘subjective’ over tendencies to consign vague notions to the 
margins of study, or in order to find in music that which is general versus that 
which is specific and material (philosophical musicology versus technical musicol­
ogy,) is for me a key factor in present-day considerations of music. The question 
as to whether we can say something important about music without reference 
to empirically hard evidence, in practice obtained by means of specific analyti­
cal methods, is a question which in a somewhat different rhetoric was posed in 
the 1920s by Charles Seeger and which remains current today (George Steiner, 
Pascal Quignard, Emile Cioran). Fascinating for the musicologist is the observa­
tion and recognition of the implacable mechanism of the birth and working of that 
something resembling a lie which, for the lack of other possibilities, we cultivate, 
namely the translation of musical Mystery into language—almost irrespective 
of whether it be the language of learning or any other language. Yet the virtue of 
these processes of verbalisation is that they allow our experience of music to be an 
object of dialogue with other people. Whilst experience itself is something private 
and intimate, meaning belongs to the realm of that which is public and may be the 
object of various forms of communication.
Fourthly, and lastly, Tomaszewski chose to restrict the processes of 
encoding, decoding and verbalisation in relation to the symbolic text to that culture 
in which it ‘arose and to which it was addressed’ (p. 59). This step is regrettable, 
since the problem of reception, particularly when we speak of the contemporary 
multiplicity of artistic practices, should be treated not only as a manifestation of 
the vitality of the native culture to which works created with that intention belong. 
Also crucial here is the axis between the native culture or homeland of a given 
symbolic text and the culture(s) which takes up, adapts and challenges those texts, 
which makes them an object of play, manipulation and reflection. In the phase of 
reception, we are never dealing with a ‘holistic approach’ to the work (p. 59), since 
the phase of reception—both intra- and intercultural—is endless; the multitude 
of ‘stations’ (particular ‘interpretations’) along that path are items of evidence of 
the work of sense/meaning, and they contribute to the processes of the stabilisa­
tion or destabilisation of the established order. From the brief discussions set out 
above, it emerges quite clearly that the order of phases in Tomaszewski is limited
fourfold. One, through the closure to the ‘pre-conceptional’, ‘source’ problem; 
two, the closure concerns the ‘sensotropic’ sphere, particularly in relation to the 
receiver; three, it is linked to the restriction of the role of musical meanings to one 
single phase; and the fourth limitation arises when the work of senses/meanings 
is reduced to the cultural area proper to the given symbolic text.
Time now to account for my decision to call Tomaszewski’s conception a spot­
light conception. Well, this spotlightness signifies here, as is self-evident, the 
lack of that which integrates, and so of the denominator to which the author 
and his commentators could reduce, and from which they could extract, all the 
ontological forms of the ‘work’, as is suggested by the chapter on the principle o f 
ontological plenitude. The interpreter in Tomaszewski’s conception deals each time 
with an object (‘a different kind of research object’, as Tomaszewski writes) which 
he must illuminate by means of different tools, arising from different assump­
tions regarding the nature of that object, and using different terminology. When 
turning the spotlight on one of the objects submerged in the particular phases— 
objects distinguished with greater or lesser precision—we leave the others in the 
shade, awaiting their turn, for the spotlight to move. Between these assumptions, 
tools and terminological apparatus there is no equivalence; they concern different 
ontological domains. A  different picture, created with different tools, appears 
when we speak of the pre-conceptional phase and the phase of the reception of 
the symbolic text as part of intercultural exchange. A different picture again is 
obtained when interpreting an acoustic text from the phase of aesthetic perception 
and another when we focus on the work as intentional entity in relation to its tonal 
and non-tonal components; nota bene I do not know why Tomaszewski attributes 
‘aestheticity’ to the phase of perception alone, although aisthesis pervades all the 
stages in the shaping of the work and its manifestations in culture. This spotlight­
ness, and by consequence the ‘separateness’ of the points of view defined by the 
‘turns of the spotlight’, revealing ‘separate’, distinct objects of study, is not a fault 
in Tomaszewski’s conception if we draw from it the right conclusions. The author 
is correct in pointing to the need for a multi-faceted approach to the musical work, 
to the variety of perspectives, the use of which can only enhance the richness of the 
picture that emerges from each cognitive contact with a work of musical art. As to 
the value of such an attitude, no musicologist can have any doubt. Spotlightness, as 
I understand it, also assumes something more—a play of light and shade in a dual 
sense. When the spotlight falls on one of the objects (phases, texts, aspects, etc.), 
the others plunge into darkness or—at best—are eclipsed and weakened by the 
shadow that arises on the periphery of the luminosity, in the action of which that 
object and no other has found itself. So what does this mean for the other objects 
(their multitude is evoked by Tomaszewski), which, after all, in keeping with the 
premises of the integral method, should (unceasingly) remain in the light, in order 
to make evident the action of the principle of ‘unity in diversity’ exemplified by the 
musical work integrated in all the phases of its manifestation in culture?
The problem does not go away. Tomaszewski not only seeks integrity, but 
also calls his method integral, arousing understandable interest and a need for 
questions as to what underpins this integrity. The lack of an answer admittedly 
does not make the task of reconstruction any easier for us. Perhaps Tomaszewski 
tacite assumes the existence of ‘some’ form of integrity—based on sources, pre- 
constitutive in relation to that which this integrity concretises and maintains. But 
we can go further and point to several possibilities, the perception and considera­
tion of which would—perhaps—lead to the constitution of an integral method based 
on clear premises. A helping hand here is extended by Tomaszewski himself, when 
he places the notion of the ‘text’ (in the semiotic sense of the word, as he himself 
stipulates) at the centre of his repertoire of notions—alongside the phases. Were 
we to advance one step further, although without predicating on the notion of the 
‘text’ (in this convention it is more of a hindrance than a help), but on the sign, 
and so turning to pansemioticism, then the first restrained hypothesis would read 
as follows: adopting a pansemiotic attitude would make it possible to obtain in 
the category of the sign, or even better of the sign-triad, an integrating category, 
since, as the rule says, a sign as a sign in potentia requires its object (music—>extra- 
musical reality) and interpretant (Piercean pragmatics places no little emphasis 
on this aspect of semiotic processes). This triple relationship, the ties imposed by 
semiotics as Wissenschaftslehre, creates an unbroken sequence of mediations, as 
is worth remembering, particularly when speaking about the phasic manifestation 
of the work in culture, and especially about the sphere of reception. Continual 
mediation, occurring via the intermediary of the sign, precludes any closure of 
the sphere of reception in either the time or the space of a given culture. Quite the 
opposite: it renders reception irrepressibly dynamic and creative. Tomaszewski 
could have turned to pansemioticism, with its integrating function of the sign;
I believe, however, that he preferred not to, since adopting such an option would 
have meant accepting that—to put it trivially—‘everything could mean everything’.
As a consequence, Tomaszewski would have granted the receiver in essence 
the unconstrained, or only slightly restricted, possibility of creating meanings 
not necessarily concordant with the intentio operis or intentio auctoris; the 
desideratum of rising to the level of the work would become radically weakened, 
and the whole situation would incur the label of a postmodernistic revolt. On 
another occasion, I wrote on this matter the following: ‘In juxtaposing Ferenc 
Liszt’s Consolatio and Fryderyk Chopin’s etudes, which continue to “stimulate and 
move”, with Włodzimierz Kotohski’s Study fo r  one strike o f a cymbal, which at 
most raises an eyebrow and ‘a chuckle’, Tomaszewski assumes, although he does 
so covertly, that sense works in one direction alone -.from the work to the receiver. 
Yet he does not take into account the fact that there exists an extensive area of the 
working of sense which acts in the opposite direction: to the work from the receiver. 
Eveiy work of art or, more broadly, every aesthetic object has an ‘open’, in some 
fundamental sense ‘incomplete’, status, and sense-generative processes running
from the receiver to the work can be unpredictable. The senses which appear as 
a result of such processes cannot be derived from the work; they are not expected by 
the receiver himself, and not assumed by the composer. This state of affairs by no 
means results from a deviational character to the syntactic and/or semantic design 
of the work or a strategy of deception consciously programmed by the composer 
to show up the receiver’s lack of competence (in an extreme instance, to ridicule 
him), but the very nature of the open work, of every work of art.29
Donald Davidson’s charity principle recommends treating the text we are 
interpreting kindly, even if we draw attention to its more or less significant short­
comings. One crucial element in this strategy is the proposing of possible ways of 
accounting for the weaknesses spotted in the interpreted text. All the more reason, 
then, as I see it, to point to the benefits that could accrue from indicating the areas 
around which philosophical thought guides us, ascribing to the notion o f‘integrity’ 
a wide range of content. I shall enumerate just a few of these, without subjecting 
them to detailed analysis, since that task passes beyond the framework set for my 
text. Irrespective of the possible solution proposed a few paragraphs ago, namely 
that of pansemioticism with its integrating role of the sign-triad, with account 
taken of the premise of synechism, that is, the continuity of cognition, I see the 
following significations of the notion of ‘integrity’ which for both historical and 
philosophical reasons might be applicable:
• The integrity of all things, derived from the argument of the harmony and 
symmetry of the cosmos, united by a musical ideal. Let us recall that this is exactly 
what Hermann Hesse’s creation Lii Bu We had in mind in The Glass Bead Game: 
‘Perfect music has its cause. It arises from equilibrium. Equilibrium arises from 
righteousness, and righteousness arises from the meaning of the cosmos.’30 Music, 
which permeates the universe and man, becomes the object of a cult shaping the 
life of man in everyday harmony, purity (the aforementioned clarity gains a further 
significance) and closeness to the truth.
• Integrity from the perspective of the hierarchy of entities, of which the 
fundamental entity has an integrating power.
• The integrity which signifies the original indivisibility of sensory cognition 
into the separate senses: ‘original unity broken up into the imperfection of the 
senses’.31
• The integrity of existence orientated towards special kinds of value and 
emotional involvement, without which the cognition and comprehension of
29 Maciej Jabłoński, "Etyka interpretacji a krytyka muzyczna" [The ethics of interpretation 
and musical criticism], (paper delivered to a symposium ‘de Musica’, Warsaw, January 9,2009,7].
30 Hermann Hesse, The Glass Bead Game, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York, 
1979), 31.
31 Maria Podraza-Kwiatkowska, "O muzycznej i niemuzycznej koncepcji poezji" [On a 
musical and non-musical conception of poetry], in Muzyka w literaturze [Music in literature] 
ed. A. Hejmej (Kraków, 2002), 49.
reality becomes impossible; the integrating role would therefore be fulfilled by in­
ner experience. Tomaszewski’s phrase ‘I experience, therefore I am’ could testify 
in favour of this interpretation.
• The integrity of word and deed, the concordance of the intention and the 
sense of the work, and so authenticity (some even prefer to speak of ‘truth’); 
authenticity—excellence: the integritas -  consonantia -  perfectio of Aquinas, 
whom Tomaszewski readily invokes?32
Each of the meanings of the notion of ‘integrity’ invoked here, and all the others 
for which space was wanting, could acquire reflections of quite sizeable proportions. 
However, two solutions seem worthy of particular attention. The first is based on 
the ontological interpretation of integrity, whilst the second is connected to the cat­
egory of experience. The application of the premises of theories of integral ontology 
(e.g. that of Andrzej Chmielecki) to musicology requires not only consideration 
but also a hefty dose of boldness, given the nature of our subject—music, which 
makes any sort of consideration on the subject of its ontological status engender 
doubts and at times even disappointments (this was demonstrated by Zofia Lissa 
and other critics of Ingarden’s theory, it was shown by Ridley in a dispute with 
advocates of ‘identity’ conceptions of the musical work, and it is indicated by the 
debate between Platonist and anti-Platonist philosophers that was carried on a few 
years ago on the pages of The British Journal o f Aesthetics).33
Assuming for a moment that an attempt at such an application might succeed, 
one should enumerate at least a few of the premises of integral ontology, the first of 
which is considered fundamental. This is the premise that there exists some basic 
entity, One, from which many arise, which ensures continuity and determines the 
transformations and multiplication of that which is Primary. Such thinking has 
its deeply historically-rooted justification in the form of the Great Chain of Being, 
‘composed of an immense, or—by the strict but seldom rigorously applied logic of 
the principle of continuity—of an infinite, number of links ranging in hierarchical 
order from the meagerest kinds of existents, which barely escape non-existence, 
through “every possible” grade up to the ens perfectissimum’.34 Leszek Nowak, 
a philosopher particularly close to my own way of thinking on the postulates of 
the interpenetration of philosophy and literature and the links between art and 
science (poetry and idealistic method in science) approaches the problem of a 
distinguished basic entity in the following way: ‘A variety of metaphysical doctrines 
fall within a certain common structure. First they identify entities which exist, and
32 Paweł Taranczewski, "Estetyka ekstatyczna i normatywna Władysława Stróżewskiego" 
[Władysław Stróżewski’s ecstatic and normative aesthetic], Krytyka i estetyka, 5/2 (2003), 
194. The term ‘ecstatic and normative aesthetic’ would certainly also largely suit Mieczysław 
Tomaszewski’s way of thinking about values, the work and musicology, which is keenly interested 
in ontology and aesthetics.
33 Julian Dodd, Works o f  Music. An Essay in Ontology (Oxford, 2007).
34 Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain o f Being (Cambridge, 1936), 59.
then they postulate the relationship in which something must stand to something 
which has already been deemed an entity in order to be deemed an entity itself.35 
Nowak clarifies that ‘the history of European philosophy adheres to a certain line 
of development’, marked by four paradigms: the ‘realcentric’ (the basic entities are 
external to man and may be both material and ideal), ‘theocentric’ (the absolute is 
the only basic entity), ‘anthropocentric’ (man occupies the place of things, ideas or 
God; this paradigm was fixed by Descartes in his cogitationes, ‘and the existence of 
everything else [...] must be deducible from the original premise of the existence 
of the human I’36) and ‘sociocentric’, in which the basic entity is a collectivity, and 
not a single person. Nowak, studying the memorably inspiring, albeit controversial, 
thought of Andrzej Falkiewicz, adds ‘subjectocentricsm’, derived from that thought, 
where the primary entity is ‘I’, the ‘subjectum’, the ‘individual’. Two modest quotes 
from Falkiewicz’s views show what the Poznań philosopher had in mind: ‘living in 
the world, I am already together with it, always lam  it. And so the problem of being 
of the world is above all a problem of me being, the only intimate problem which 
I resolve competently and in my own name’; ‘[...] that which I cognise as a private 
person and which I study as a humanist, biologist, physicist and microphysicist is 
a network o f subjective and objective relations, a product of relationships about 
which my own relationship with the world can give me an approximate—yet the 
only available—idea.’37 Availing ourselves of a few random examples, we would 
say that the realcentric paradigm (materialistic variant) would embrace the view 
of Nelson Goodman, who posited in Languages o f Art that the ‘score thus de­
fines the work’ and that ‘complete compliance with the score is the only require­
ment for a genuine instance of a work’.38 Peter Kivy, meanwhile, suggests that 
musical works are generalities, pre-compositional tonal structures of a sort, the 
performances of which are their embodiments or signs; Kivy thus places himself 
within the same paradigm, but in the idealistic variant. Marxist theories, mean­
while, including the theory of reflection, will be placed within the sociocentric 
paradigm (some theories advanced by anthropologists could also be located here, 
as well as within the anthropocentric paradigm, from John Blacking’s ‘How musi­
cal is Man?’ and Wolfgang Suppan’s ‘Das musizierende Mensch’ to theses formu­
lated by cognitivists or biomusicologists. Let us note that the anthropocentric, or 
more neatly anthropotelic,39 paradigm abounds in loci commune with the socio­
centric paradigm, on account, among other things, of the integrating role of the
35 Leszek Nowak, "Zagadka punktu wyjścia" [The conundrum of the point of departure], 
Poznańskie Studia z  Filozofii Humanistyki, 18, Mass., 43.
36 Ibid.
37 Andrzej Falkiewicz, Istnienie i metafora, (Wrocław, 1996), 156,168.
38 Nelson Goodman, Languages o f Art (Indianapolis, 1976), 178,186.
39 Andrzej L. Zachariasz, "Czy humanizm jest antropotelizmem?" [Is humanism anthropote- 
lism?], in Humanizm. Tradycje i przyszłość [Humanism. Traditions and future] T. Szkoiut (ed.), 
(Lublin, 2003), 151-174. Anthropotelism holds that man is an entity that acts with a purpose.
cognitive triad of ‘senses -  reason -  faith’ which Pitirim Sorokin regarded as the 
basic components of his theoretical system known in sociology as ‘integralism’).
In Chmielecki’s opinion, integral ontology is ‘the most general theory of reality’, 
and the notion of being has a contextual character, which means that it assumes 
the existence of other entities; *[...] the existence of some entity is at once neces­
sarily its coexistence with other entities’, he writes.40 From the point of view of 
integral ontology and its premises, which was my point of departure here, it is 
important to correctly interpret the entity composed of ‘essence’ and ‘existence’, 
defined by factors of determination (these determine what an entity is—its essence, 
including the essence of music) and factors of realisation (these, in turn, deter­
mine the existence of an entity, that is, its appearance and duration, including the 
existence of music, the Ingardenian ‘musical work as a phenomenon manifesting 
itself in the cultural space in a phasically differentiated way’). These factors could 
also serve—if we accepted and developed the premises of integral ontology—the 
reality of art, which is the bearer of values; Chmielecki speaks about this, although 
he treats values as ideal entities, distinguished from empirical products. The heart 
of the problem lies in the fact that such values fulfil neither the criterion of acting 
or being a source of changes in something else, for example in the relationship 
‘art’-‘man’, nor the criterion of being an object of effect, that is, being altered by 
outside action.41 Finally, it is time to note that integral ontology grants existen­
tial fundamentality to some form of physical, although not necessarily material, 
existence and treats the ultimate establishing of that which exists in the form 
of some ideal entity (the differences between Chmielecki and Nowak on this 
matter would require a separate discussion). On this last issue, Chmielecki writes: 
‘thus the “establishing” of something is that by which that something is defined, 
it is the source of its essential properties, its being something specific’; it falls 
to us, therefore, to consider the question as to which of the external determi­
nants ‘establishes’, is the source of the essential properties of art, and of music in 
particular, since both are encompassed by ‘the most general theory of reality’, 
that is, integral ontology.42
A separate—and striking—issue arises from Nowak’s subjectocentrism, namely 
experience—most probably inner experience (Tomaszewski’s ‘I experience, there­
fore I am’). This problem is all the more striking in that the figures of the critical
Besides this, Zachariasz distinguishes the ‘cosmocentric’ paradigm, which could contain the first 
of the meanings of ‘integrity’ enumerated in the present article and supplement Nowak’s list.
40 Andrzej Chmielecki, "Ontologia integralna" [Integral ontology], in Wykłady z ontologii 
[Lectures on ontology] <www.wnsts.strony.univ.gda.pl/.../chmielewski-w-ontologia-20o6.pdf>, 64.
41 Ibid, 66, 72. A  conception of integral ontology constructed in this way would not, the­
refore, encompass the view of music according to which it possesses the capacity to affect the 
receiver, or it should be said at least that this capacity is not connected with the sphere of values 
(expression—in one of the meanings of this notion—as a value).
42 Ibid, 65.
thought of our times which serve to break up the identity ‘I’ include the dismantling 
of the Cartesian cogito and also Lacan’s assertion that ‘I’ does not exist, but only 
occurs, most commonly ‘in brief moments of perfect anarchy, of discontinuity’.43 
The propositions for extreme solutions, born in contemporary culture, such as 
a particular kind of experience of reading which weakens the subject, leading to 
its reinterpretation (as in Thomas the Obscure, by Maurice Blanchot, for whom 
experience is transcendence and destabilisation), collide with attempts—drawn 
from a completely different perspective—to reconstitute the Schopenhauerian 
‘contemplation’,44 or the Schellingian ‘blessed silence’, reflection on oneself and 
removing the questions of art from the jurisdiction of time, located within Bohrer’s 
concept of an absolute present. These and other views, such as Charles Taylor’s 
considerations of the subjectivity of language and the understanding—Romantic 
in spirit—of that which is individual, exemplify the problem of experience as 
a task for contemporary human science, with particular focus on such questions 
as ‘modernity as experience’, ‘the immediacy of experience’ (Eggebrecht writes 
that the experiencing of music, like no other art form, is imbued with imme­
diacy), ‘the extinction of experience’, ‘the uncertainty of experience’, ‘cognition -  
apprehension -  experiencing’, or finally the ‘discursive mediation of experience’. 
The tension that is expressed in the relations ‘between [...] experiential immediacy 
and [...] the discursive mediation ofthat experience’ constitutes, regardless of the 
evaluation of that state of affairs, one of the main—and still inspiring—points of 
reference for the inevitably polyphonic debate on the role of experience in our 
cognition and experiencing of the world, including art.45 Perceiving the category of 
experience from the perspective of the ‘third modernity’ (Stephen Toulmin’s term) 
not only imposes the above questions, which ignite discussions of the elusiveness 
of the object of reflection, and even its inaccessibility or the limits of its extremity 
(e.g. representations of the Holocaust). These discussions very often draw on the 
wide-ranging etymology of this notion, pointing to semantic fields created in the 
history and practice of various languages, referring to such meanings as ‘being in 
passage’ and ‘openness to boundless space’, ‘perception and knowledge’, ‘inten­
tional action’, and finally, most crucially, ‘putting oneself to the test’, describing 
the possible negative consequences of our contact with the world, the uncertainty 
and fear which are the result of sensory participation and action, including the
43 Agata Bielik-Robson, Inna Nowoczesność. Pytania o współczesną formułę duchowości 
[Another modernity. Questions of a contemporary formula for spirituality] (Kraków, 2000), 75.
44 Arthur Schopenhauer writes: *[...] we forget our individuality, our will, and continue to 
exist only as pure subject, as clear mirror of the object [...]’, A. Schopenhauer, The World as Will 
and Representation, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York, 1966), i:i78. Cf. Karl Heinz Bohrer, ‘Abso­
lutna teraźniejszość’, tr. Krystyna Krzemieniowa (Warsaw, 2003), 198 [Ger. orig. Das absolute 
Präsens (Frankfurt am Main, 1994)].
45 Martin Jay, "Granice doświadczenia granicznego" [The limits of critical experience], in 
M. Kwiek (ed.), Nie pytajcie mnie, kim jestem. Michel Foucault dzisiaj [Don’t ask me who I am. 
Michel Foucault today] (Poznań, 1998), 59.
gaining or accumulating of experience, in the world (a motif employed in the de­
constructionist concepts of experience of Blanchot and Jacques Derrida).46
Therefore, musicology in respect to modernity has also to consider the problem 
of experience in all its subtle riches, certainly not reduced merely to the laws of 
perception and to conclusions issuing from reflection and research conducted as 
part of the ‘biomusicology paradigm’. The discussion of the figures of subjectivity 
carried on, by no means furtively, by Carolyn Abbate47 and Karol Berger48 and in 
the text by Ridley already cited several times here, rejecting ontology in favour 
of aesthetics, that is, performance and its experiencing, are good examples of the 
interest in this problem among musicologists. The question of the immediacy of 
the experiencing of music and its discursive fruits is not exclusively a dilemma of 
post-modern humanists, as it was discussed in the 1920s by Charles Seeger, fully 
aware of the gulf that arises between experience of music and its verbalisation. 
The American musicologist firmly maintained that ‘musical knowledge’, which 
arises as part of the process of practising music, of intimate and intuitive contact 
with it, never translates satisfactorily into ‘knowledge about music’, which helps 
to form the foundations of the science that musicology would be. Thus musical 
experience is experience o f music, and not triggered by music. In this context, it 
is worth noting the words of Leo Tolstoy, which reflect another very interesting 
example of experience: ‘While I listened [to the music of Chopin -  MJ], I became 
as one with Chopin; I felt as if I had composed the piece myself.49 Kendall Walton, 
for his part, develops this idea of the artist, confirming us in the conviction of the 
extraordinary, but also mysterious, nature of this experience: ‘I feel intimate with 
the music -  more intimate , even, than I feel with the world of the painting. The 
word of the painting (...) is out there, something I observe from an external per­
spective. But it is as though I am inside the music, or it is inside me. [...] a most 
personal and subjective manner.’ (Marcia Herndon calls this phenomenon ‘flow’). 
Thus we speak about reception, about experience in which the subject ‘merges’ 
with the object, is unable to build any distance in respect to it, cannot distinguish 
himself and music as two independently existing entities. We also speak about 
reception which absorbs the listener, his whole physical being and awareness, to 
such an extent that he does not notice the world around him.50
46 Ryszard Nycz, "O nowoczesności jako doświadczeniu" [On modernity as experience], 
Teksty Drugie, 2006/3, 8-9. See also Barbara Skarga, Kwintet metafizyczny [Metaphysical qu­
intet] (Kraków, 2005), 120, and Andrzej Leśniak, Blanchot, Derrida. Topografie doświadczenia 
[Blanchot and Derrida. The topography of experience] (Kraków, 2003), 7-8  (the etymology cited 
here also includes ‘danger’, ‘boundary’ and ‘threat’).
47 Carolyn Abbate, "Music -  Drastic Or Gnostic?", Critical Inquiry, 30 (2004), 505-536.
48 Karol Berger, "Musicology according to Don Giovanni, or: should we get drastic?", Journal 
o f Musicology, 22/3 (2005), 490-501.
49 George Marek and Maria Gordon-Smith, Chopin (New York, 1978), 246.
50 Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination. Is Music Representational?", in Music and 
Meaning, ed. Jenefer Robinson (Ithaca, 1997), 71-72.
This kind of experience can certainly be called ‘integral’, due to the sense of 
the unity, the indivisibility of the two entities: the musical work and the receiver. 
Understood in this way, integrity takes on a special dimension, if we take into 
account the case of the artistic performance of a musical work or even the inspiring 
concept o f ‘music as performance’, willingly discussed today. ‘Between the script 
of the score [...] and us lies a huge, phenomenal explosion, performance’, writes 
Abbate. Phenomenal in that it has an ethical dimension, although ethicality is here 
in some sense confined to the sphere which is enclosed on one hand by the rules 
and norms of the profession and on the other by the integrity of the performer 
(e.g. in respect to the intentio auctoris, if we ascribe to this instance a central, or 
at least a significant, role in the hierarchy of the sources of musical sense). This 
sort of integrity is ‘weaker’ than integrity in the strictly moral sense—that which 
we consider as referring to the value of virtue and to the identity of man. Hence 
reference to the quasi-moral character of ‘integrity as a professional integrity’ of 
musical performance.51 From this, as from the earlier examples of the phenomenon 
of integrity and of the ways in which it is conceptualised, it ensues quite clearly that 
it has numerous connections with the sphere of the ontology of the musical work 
(one would ask if this applies only to the work of music as traditionally understood. 
How—if at all—should we interpret the ‘integrity’ of those musical manifestations 
which on principle oppose the substance of this notion, just as they oppose the 
categories of ‘unity’ or ‘identity’—in the theoretical sense or in the philosophical 
sense, as Ridley would have it?), with the sphere of cognition and experiencing 
on all the levels of their organisation (emotional, intellectual) and in respect to 
all the participants in musical communication (individual/community, composer/ 
performer/receiver, critic and scholar, who is only seemingly capable of extricating 
himself from the subjective context of justifying his theoretic assertions). Finally, 
the notion of integrity also has connections in the axiological sphere, particularly 
in the relationship of aesthetic to ethical values. To the question ontology or aes­
thetics? aesthetics or ethics? cognition or experience? I do not seek an answer 
here, as I have doubts as to whether such an explanation, although desirable for 
disinterestedly enquiring science, would resolve any of the blessed riddles set us 
by the art of music.
51 Stan Godlovitch, "The Integrity of Musical Performance", Journal o f  Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, 51/4 (1993)» 580.
